Evidence-based medicine ("EBM"), a decisionmaking process that uses the best available objectively assessed knowledge as a substitute for authority-based opinions, has transformed the practice of medicine. EBM has been hailed as one of the 15 greatest medical milestones since 1840. 1 EBM is now regularly taught in medical schools and has been accepted by most major health-related organizations, worldwide. 2 As a method to reduce the effects of bias and excessive reliance on expert judgment to make decisions, evidence-based logic ("EBL") has been adopted by many nonmedical disciplines, including businesses, engineering, baseball, 2 and even advertising. 3 Recognizing the opportunities for use of EBL in toxicology, we developed a comprehensive framework for an evidence-based toxicology ("EBT"). 2 Our article explored the principles of causation determination, showing how use of EBM/EBL could identify evidence-based causation conclusions for toxicology and, thus, improve risk communication. Contemporaneously, Hoffman and Hartung 4 proposed use of a quantitative EBT to develop statistical and probabilistic methods for analyzing and validating the predictive value of toxicity tests. We are gratified that the interest generated by these two articles led to the first International Forum Towards Evidence-Based Toxicology, held in October 2007. Proceedings of the First International Forum Towards Evidence-Based Toxicology, Conference Centre Spazio Villa Erba, Como, Italy, 15-18, October 2007 . The proceedings are presented in this issue. 5 Attending this three-day meeting made it clear that many participants had limited familiarity with EBT, and yet its logic and its intended transparency seemed promising. Much of the commentary was encouraging. However, at least two almost reflexive and somewhat emotional objections were vocalized by some attendees. These were as follows: 1) Toxicologists already use "evidence" in reaching causation decisions and regulatory decisions. Acknowledgment of EBT might linguistically imply that pre-EBT toxicological opinions had not been not formed with the use of evidence and scientific reasoning. In short, EBT is nothing new except the terminology. 2) Toxicologists often do not have available human experimental data (e.g., randomized clinical trials), as is common with EBM. Therefore, requiring actual experimental results for toxicology is too demanding and unrealistic. We should continue to reach conclusions as we always have (derived from a lesser standard of evidence) because we are doing the best we can do.
For those familiar with EBM and EBT, the simple answer to the first concern is that while all authoritative (expert) opinions are based at least in part on evidence (unless they are pure speculation), not all opinions are evidence-based conclusions. Sometimes, toxicologists or a regulatory agency like the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), just like some physicians, formulate an opinion and cite selected scientific data in support. 2, 6 EBT is the reverse. EBT conducts a complete and transparent rule-based analysis of the data and then formulates the conclusion, one that should be reproducible by others familiar with the method. The need for EBT seems clear. Toxicologists can be irrational in their assessment of chemical risks. 7 It has been reported that toxicology causation decisions reached in the recent past did not exhibit such evidence-based characteristics. See for example Refs. 8-13. The second concern, lack of definitive required data in toxicology, stands the matter on its head. Causal conclusions are not dimensional entities adjustable by accommodating them to the availability of evidence. Data should be judged by the standard, and not vice versa. When there are sufficient amounts and types of evidence, we may be able to conclude that we have discovered a scientific fact. In some fields, such as the social sciences or economics, limited opportunity for experimentation inherently makes it difficult to reach cause and effect conclusions or to quantify outcomes about complex processes. 14 When toxicological data are too sparse to reach a scientific conclusion, the "expert opinion" should clearly and transparently note the assumptions and extrapolations used. Toxicology opinions, like medical practices guidelines, can be identified as recommendations that are evidence-based as distinguished from those that, often by necessity, have been formed by expert opinion. 15 Resistance by some to the inclusion of an EBT standard is not unexpected. Such reactions to EBT are reminiscent of the objections to incorporating EBM into the process of formulating medical guidelines and patient decision-making. 16 Some physicians, feeling threatened by what they perceived as usurpation of their individual authority over patient care (eminence-based medicine, eloquence basedmedicine, etc. 17 ) create all manner of objections, including dire admonitions that EBM would lead to rigid, cookbook medicine. 2 Also advanced (even today) are conspiracy theories from some physicians, proponents of so-called complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), practitioners of chiropractics, 18 and others. They believe that although EBM is put forward as a carefully selected catchword 6 advocating quality measures, in reality, it is a plot by medical insurance companies to avoid paying physicians' fees. 19 There are also more extreme postmodernist philosophic attacks describing the hegemony of EBM as "microfascism".' 20 More blatantly political is the charge that EBM as embodied by the Cochrane Collaboration has been corrupted by moneyed interests. 21 It is in this context that we read, with some bemusement, a recent commentary by Rudén and Hansson, 21 members of an academic philosophy unit, apocalyptically warning that our EBT article threatens the current structure of regulatory risk assessment practice. Dr Rudén's article, written more as a legal brief than as scientific discourse, a is laced with a number of errors of fact and reasoning, self-contradictions, and contains, inappropriately for scientific discussion, personal polemics. Her evident errors of understanding many parts of our article may be explainable. b Less obvious is why she seems to be quite unfamiliar with (or willing to disregard) her own work. We cited Dr Rudén for being the first author we encountered to show that toxicological risk assessments and causation determinations (whether affirmative or negative) by various scientific agencies did not always follow "good science" c principles. Examining the evidence in 29 published "cancer risk assessments" done for the same chemical (trichloroethylene) by authoritative groups, Dr Rudén showed that the datasets used were varyingly incomplete and concluded that the reviews were biased in their data selection, data interpretation, and data evaluation. [8] [9] [10] Her stinging criticism of toxicology for producing inconsistent, uncritical, and incomplete causation analyses for various chemicals, for example, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [23] [24] [25] is not easily reconciled with her agitated denouncement of EBT, which offers a remedy for the very flaws she had uncovered in her review of these 29 "risk assessments."
Still, at least some of Dr Rudén's misconceptions 22 also surfaced at discussions held at the International Forum Towards Evidence-Based Toxicology (though presented more decorously). Therefore, we address salient (but by no means all) of Dr Rudén's admonishments about EBT to give additional clarifications to the principles we presented previously. 26 To begin with, Rudén and Hansson simply cannot seriously object that our use of the term "epistemic" to mean "known" is somehow misleading, when their own definition is "of or relating to knowledge a First, Dr Rudén's forebodings were accompanied with charges of our philosophic dishonesty, linguistic manipulations to deceive, secretly conspiring with the tobacco industry to dismantle expert judgment in regulatory activity so as to endanger public health, and inappropriate commingling of medicine with toxicology. None is true. Second, she declined both a public invitation 25 and a personal invitation offered by the HET field editor to submit an article or commentary on EBT. Instead, Dr Rudén chose to publish her commentary in the International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, a publication that now communicates little in the way of scientific find-ings but instead is well-known for producing personal or political attacks by its editor (Egilman, DS, Bohme, SR. Over a barrel: corporate corruption of science and its effects on workers and the environment. International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 2005; 11: 331-337), or by scientists who disagree politically with others. b Dr Rudén is not a physician and, according to her background and publication record, has little experience with making contributions to original basic science research. Perhaps Dr Rudén did not read our paper completely, inasmuch as she omits mention of large sections that readily address virtually all of the arguments she advances. Many attendees at the International Forum Towards Evidence-Based Toxicology meeting found useful information when directed to appropriate sections of Guzelian, et al., 2005 2 . c Dr Rudén's "good science" sounds quite similar to the phrases "sound science" and "Good Epidemiological Practices," which she vilifies because she claims they are associated with the tobacco industry. or degree of acceptance". More important, among "nomological possibilities," d we included knowledge of the substance/disease causal relationship (epistemic) as being a necessary feature of a toxicologic "risk" because that is how "risk" is understood in common parlance. For example, bankruptcy from embezzlement is a risk, a traffic accident from bus driving is a risk, hepatitis from consuming 15 g of acetaminophen is a risk, but being abducted by a space alien is not a risk. Notice that for these three risks, the predicted frequency of the occurrence of the harm in the future can be readily estimated from the scientific observations that established the identify of the risk in the first place (i.e., its causal relationship to a stimulus).
Strangely enough, Dr Rudén herself attempts to differentiate between known hazards and presumed hazards for human health based on animal data or mechanistic data in her proposed Cancer Risk Assessment Index (CRAI) system 8, 13 ; she further states, "There is always a significant amount of uncertainty inherent in the extrapolation of animal data to human health risks" 25 (emphasis added), and "The use of animal data is based on the assumption that toxic and carcinogenic effects seen in mammalian species are relevant to humans" 11 (emphasis added). Finally, she has noted that such "uncertainties" are inherent to variations and biases in the collection and interpretation of data. [8] [9] [10] 23 So, although perhaps more philosophically grounded, our designation of risks and uncertainties seems to correspond rather nicely with Dr Rudén's favored phraseology.
Still, we understand that risk assessors' argot defines "risk" differently, by referring to all nomological possibilities as chemical harms. Therein lies the problem for risk communication. e To forestall chemical harms to the public, risk assessors often simply assume as true the underlying substance/disease causal relationship for all doses under consideration even when the data do not permit such knowledge (i.e., the proposition is uncertain). They assume that some "unknown risks" (to use the language of Rudén and Hansson) 22 are true (i.e., they are known). However, the frequency of such an assumed risk is unknown and cannot be predicted. f Rather than best estimates, g the common risk assessment "risk calculations" actually are attempts to identify a range of doses at which the range of possible frequencies of occurrence of an adverse effect is acceptably small, if not zero. Indeed, when tested empirically with human epidemiology, "risk calculations" in regulatory risk assessments from animal data are not predictive of human health. [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] In short, risk assessments derived from animal cancer bioassays are known not to be human risks by the very agencies promulgating them. h Such risk estimates do not, can not, and are not intended to tell us what exposures are human risks. They attempt to identify exposures that are not risks, or, more completely, exposure levels unlikely to later be shown to be a risk.
Rudén and Hansson condemn EBT. They believe it is a stealth scheme to undermine regulatory risk assessments and expunge current protections of d All causal propositions for risk (e.g., consuming benzene in drinking water for a lifetime at 10 ppb causes leukemia in humans) are either true or false. All propositions that are not impossible are "nomological possibilities." Some will be demonstrated scientifically to be true and are then termed risks. The others, the as yet unresolved possibilities, are termed "uncertainties." 2 e Instead of the contrasting terms "risks versus uncertainties," the former and latter are sometimes designated by such adjectival modifiers, respectively, as actual risks, real risks, or known risks versus possible risks, potential risks, proposed risks, hypothetical risks, or unknown risks. Labels aside, the concept of underlying causation is the same.
f "The rule that extreme improbabilities have to be neglected [to identify scientific certainties]…becomes sufficiently explicit only [upon detailed examination.] . . . I do not deny the possibility that improbable events might occur. I do not, for example, assert that the molecules in a small volume of gas may not, perhaps for a short time spontaneously withdraw into a part of the volume, or that in a greater volume of gas spontaneous fluctuations of pressure will never occur. What I do assert is that such occurrences would not be physical effects because . . . they are not reproducible at will. Even if a physicist happened to observe such a process, he would be quite unable to reproduce it, and therefore would never be able to decide what had really happened in this case, and whether he may not have made an observational mistake." 37 g According to the USEPA, "[a]n established procedure does not yet exist for making "most likely" or "best" estimates of risk within the range of uncertainty defined by the upper and lower estimates. If data procedures become available the Agency will also provide "most likely" or "best" estimates of risk". 38 h For example, the USEPA guidance for noncancer risk assessments states that "[t]he RfD and RfC can be used to estimate a level of environmental exposure at or below which no adverse effect is expected to occur," but that "[i]n general IRIS values cannot be validly used to accurately predict the incidence of human disease or the type of effects that chemical exposures have on humans" (emphasis added) (http://www.epa.gov/iris/limits.htm). For cancer risk assessments the USEPA states, "… the linearized multistage procedure leads to a plausible upper limit to the risk …. Such an estimate, however, does not necessarily give a realistic prediction of the risk. The true value of risk is unknown, and may be as low as zero. 30 (emphasis added) public health from chemical harms. 22 On the contrary, our framework for EBT 2 does not even attempt to address the usefulness, propriety, or limitations of regulatory risk assessment/risk management procedures or policies. i Also, Rudén and Hansson chose not to share with their readers our published position, almost to the converse, that we believe it may be prudent for preventative purposes to act as if some chemicals present health risks even when scientific knowledge is inadequate 39, 40 and that, understandably, regulators assume the hazard does occur in humans to meet the intended purpose of regulatory action. 40 What we do state is that toxicological risk assessments can present a problem for risk communication; we state this because, not surprisingly, the press and public think of "risk calculations" as predictions of occurrence of "actual risks" (epistemic). Consider this frightening entry entitled "Air, Cancer Risk Linked In Some Houston Areas" in the Houston Chronicle 41 :
The results showed that some people living near industrial plants are being exposed to concentrations of pollutants that over a lifetime would increase the risk of cancer. Using data collected by air quality monitors in Texas City … found levels of 3 hazardous chemicals that, if inhaled continuously during a period of 70 years, would likely create an additional 29 to 199 cancer cases per million.
(emphasis added)
Simply, rewriting the latter sentence as a nomological "risk" statement results in:
Using data collected by air quality monitors in Texas City … found levels of 3 hazardous chemicals that, if inhaled continuously during a period of 70 years, would limit the uncertainty of additional theoretical cancer cases to fewer than 29 to 199 per million.
The latter, a literal and more accurate description of the risk assessment, would be less likely to unduly alarm the public by inappropriately implying a prediction that extra cancer cases will occur. So, just whose interests are served by perpetuating an opaque methodology and nomenclature that can so easily mislead the public? Eschewing Rudén and Hansson's political arguments, we support any thoughtful discussions on nomenclature that improve risk communication regarding known and uncertain health hazards. Quite unlike Rudén and Hansson's characterization of EBT as eccentric and out of touch with mainstream toxicology, 22 EBT fits perfectly with the evolution of toxicology from a largely applied science of conducting hazard testing into a modern experimentalism employing the latest advances in the basic sciences of biochemistry and cellular and molecular biology. The evidence-based requirements for acceptance of experimental results in toxicology by top-flight science journals should not be conflated with regulatory efforts to identify all potential hazards of a chemical, the first of the four steps in the National Academy of Science's (NAS) risk assessment's paradigm. 42 However, contrary to the views of Rudén and Hansson and others heavily invested in the process, the formulaic approach to making a regulatory "Hazard Identification" 43 is easily distinguishable from the original NAS description of "The determination of whether a particular chemical is or is not causally linked to particular health effects". Indeed, even the original NAS document recognized in a gesture to policy over science that such a determination is "often restated in terms of effects in laboratory animals or other test system" The most recent restatement of risk assessment goals by the NAS goes further by stating, explicitly, that 'once the available evidence, either epidemiologic or experimental, is judged sufficient to establish that a given finding of toxicity or carcinogenicity is potentially relevant to humans . . . the committee sees no reason for [USEPA] to spend time and resources to fine-tune the hazard classification . . . .' (emphasis added). 44 The committee's report makes it clear that the regulatory Hazard Identification step has not in the past, is not now, and most assuredly should not in the future be considered the same as an evidencebased conclusion of causation. j Hence, EBT would i On this issue we did state that "
[o]f course, many regulatory agencies, public advocacy groups, crisis managers, and safety experts advise that certain actions (such as evacuations, waste cleanups, restricted product usage, etc.) be taken to reduce "risks" even if the possibility of harm is only nomological. Such pragmatic actions may be defended by policy considerations such as reference to the Precautionary Principle: It is better to be safe than sorry. However, treating uncertainties as if they were risks, out of an abundance of caution, is wholly distinguishable from stating that those nomological possibilities are epistemic and represent risks." 2 j The committee's reasoning makes sense because whether the causal substance/disease relationship is proven by an expensive and time consuming evidence-based review or assumed as true because it is "potentially relevant," the frequency (numerical "risk" estimate) calculations are the same.
have no necessary effect on the various classification schemes Dr Rudén devotes so many pages to discussing because, as her own work has shown, such "Hazard Rankings" are designed to meet a specific regulatory goal. "Hazard Rankings" are seldom evidence-based, nor do they necessarily need to be. Often missing is an overt acknowledgment of the difference. We see a role for EBT in helping with risk communication because the categorical names for the Hazard are potentially misleading to the press and general public. Consider the category of "probable" human carcinogen. Although most English speakers might think this means that the chemical is highly likely to be a human carcinogen (i.e., an "odds-on" favorite), nothing could be further from the truth in the world of risk assessment. Though the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has, without qualification, used this label for decades, recently IARC added unceremoniously to their monographs this belated disclaimer:
The terms probably carcinogenic and possibly carcinogenic have no quantitative significance and are used simply as descriptors of different levels of evidence of human carcinogenicity, with probably carcinogenic signifying a higher level of evidence than possibly carcinogenic. 45 (emphasis added)
What is meant by level of evidence is not explained by IARC or, for that matter, by Rudén and Hansson. Not to be left out of this effort to retranslate the category's cognomen, the USEPA recently stated:
Although the term 'likely' can have a probabilistic connotation in other contexts, its use as a weight of evidence descriptor does not correspond to a quantifiable probability of whether the chemical is carcinogenic . . . As stated previously, the use of the term 'likely' as a weight of evidence descriptor does not correspond to a quantifiable probability. 46 (emphasis added)
So, it seems that all these years, "likely" never really meant "likely". Although such regulatory classification schemes are developed for the narrow use of regulatory risk management, their widespread dissemination by the press and others to the general public without any clarification of this specific jargon can become a misleading communication about the true human risk. Dr Rudén, a champion for reliance on animal test results for regulatory decisions, feels that EBT would deprive the regulator of a vital source of nonhuman data for "state-of-the-art" toxicological risk assessments. 22 Her forecast of such a privation is fanciful flogging of a dead horse. The differences between causation and regulatory decision-making have long been recognized by knowledgeable toxicologists, physicians, and epidemiologists 28, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] and has been the basis for the discussions of many articles related to the areas of toxicological risk assessments. Many, if not most, regulatory decisions will not (cannot) be evidence-based, just as not all physicians' decisions can be evidence-based due to lack of data or of data review. 2 Hence, our disagreement with Dr Rudén is that rather than accept the limitations of animal results for what they are and for the specific regulatory need they serve, she attempts, 22 instead, to elevate by sheer weight of rhetoric the predictive qualities of animal testing (although as noted earlier, in characteristic self-contradiction she does concede with one line that the many limitations of extrapolating animal data are well known among toxicologists (see page 304, column 2, paragraph 2). 22 Although a detailed rebuttal of her argument is beyond the scope of this commentary, Dr Rudén's unfamiliarity with EBL limits her understanding of simple concepts like test predictivity. For example, she states, without evidence, that animal studies "reduce the risk of false negatives at the price of an increased number of false positives." In fact, animal results translate poorly into clinical practice 52 and the leading cause of limitation or withdrawal of drugs is serious adverse reactions missed by extensive preclinical animal testing. 53 From a broader perspective, at a time when there are widespread efforts to find more useful alternatives to animal toxicity testing 54 or to develop advanced human investigative systems such as molecular epidemiology, Dr Rudén's intoned advocacy for heavy reliance on animal testing alone seems dated. Although Dr Rudén retrogresses, the NAS, is looking forward and states that "[the] new vision and strategy for toxicity testing in the 21st century . . . would be based primarily on human biology instead of animal biology, and would require anywhere between substantially fewer animals and virtually no animals. 55 Indeed, the United States Food and Drug Administration, in recently announcing its intention to use a full dress Evidence-Based Review System for evaluation of causal health claims for dietary supplements, was unequivocal on this point: "Lacking any data from human studies, animal and in vitro studies alone would not adequately support a health claim. Animal and in vitro studies can be used to generate hypotheses, investigate biological plausibility of hypotheses, or to explore a mechanism of action of a specific food component through controlled animal diets; however, these studies do not provide information from which scientific conclusions can be drawn regarding a relationship between the substance and disease in humans." 56 Dr Rudén's advocacy for increased reliance on animal testing absent human data for proof of causation is an echo from a time long past.
Rudén and Hansson's self-admitted befuddlement that "it was initially a riddle for us" regarding the similarities between EBM and EBT 22 is readily explained by the way in which clinicians make patient management decisions. Simply, both EBM and EBT are concerned with causation. Both are concerned with knowing what we know at a point in time about propositions of causation for chemicals and their effects (see also EBM and EBT similarities discussed in this issue). 57 For physicians to weigh the risks versus the benefits of a treatment, they first must know both what beneficial and adverse effects are caused and what are the predicted frequencies at which each will occur. Otherwise no weighing can occur. If the answers are not known, the physician must revert to authority (and often has to). Rudén and Hansson's distinction between toxic and therapeutic effects is one of values, not chemicals. Chemicals are apolitical. They simply act. Humans decide if the effect is desirable or not. Poisoning the formation of prostaglandin H2 and thereby inhibiting the normal platelet function of adhering to endothelial basement membrane sounds toxic, but actually underlies a widespread use for aspirin administration, that is, to prevent recurrent myocardial infarction. Once the status of knowledge has been determined, both medicine and toxicology then make management decisions that consider other factors our article intentionally does not discuss. For example, physicians must take patient values into account even when it is possible to make an evidence-based decision. Similarly, for the regulatory management of known or uncertain hazardous chemicals, such factors as costs, feasibility of remediation or controls, and the size of the population at issue may be important. There are roles for both facts and value judgments in public policy and individual therapeutics, alike. Transparency requires explicit designation of which is operative at a given time.
Finally, having become convinced that our views of EBM and risk assessment are "bizarre," Dr Rudén apparently performed a transcontinental psychological analysis into our motivations. She deduced that we are secretly trying to advance the evil interests of the tobacco industry. 22 On the contrary, we would have acknowledged sponsors for our EBT article, 2 but we had none, including tobacco companies. Moreover, Dr Rudén either did not read or does not care about the many pages in our article devoted to a searching analysis of cigarettes and lung cancer as the foremost example of reaching an evidencebased conclusion of risk even when the database contains solely observational studies but no human experimental trials. k Selectively setting aside such unaccommodating facts, Dr Rudén then seized on "sound science" which, she states, is a code phrase of the tobacco industry used to oppose regulatory action unless full scientific proof of harm is in hand. This subversive political agenda was abandoned when "sound science" became thoroughly discredited (we are not told how, by whom, or why). Seeing a rough equivalence between her interpretations of "sound science" and her own concocted implications of EBT for risk management, Dr Rudén reasoned that we must have developed EBT as a new, more palatable slogan for the same obstructionist principle. Finally, after apparently carrying out extensive research on toxic tort litigations in the United States (not an unremarkable accomplishment for a Swedish scientist who acknowledges no assistance from attorneys in this regard l ), she asserts that because she believes one of us consulted for a tobacco company, briefly, more than 25 years ago, m the loop closes on her supposition that we designed EBT as a pretext to help sell tobacco. n k Ironically, Dr Rudén chose, perhaps without thinking the matter through, one of the strongest known examples of the limitations of animal extrapolations. Human observational evidence led to causation even though the animal evidence for cigarette smoking gave a false negative result. l How did Swedish scientists acquire such professional interests about U.S. civil litigations? Regardless, Dr Rudén makes false or misleading assertions about Dr Guzelian's practice of consulting medical toxicology. Dr Guzelian has testified under oath that he has no documentation of a contract for consulting services to Phillip Morris and was never was paid $100,000 in Phillip Morris consulting fees for even one year, much less yearly. Pertinently, Dr Guzelian has never testified on behalf of a tobacco industry client. For more than 20 years, Dr Guzelian has consulted for, and at times has testified on behalf of, lawyers representing plaintiffs and those representing defendants in personal injury matters, as well as parties involved in regulatory matters, product development, criminal matters, and others all involving the possible toxic effects of chemical agents. m Dr Guzelian has freely disclosed his private consulting practices in his publications (see Ref. 25 ; see also Ref. 58) n Such sleuthing was so unnecessary! A simple collegial call or email to anyone of us could have cleared up for Dr Rudén this "puzzle," thereby freeing her from her binding Probably not intended as a compliment, she goes on to criticize one of us for using the same high standard of evidence and analysis (characterized and published as EBT) when formulating expert opinions for use in a legal matter about causation of disease by a chemical. This assertion, actually, is correct. We most certainly do attempt to use EBT whenever possible. We cannot imagine doing otherwise! To have one standard when trying to be accepted in public by scientific peers but then to adopt a different, lower, biased standard for the more cloistered world of the courtroom would be unprofessional and, probably, unethical. Furthermore, how better to avoid the influences of the bias that Dr Rudén attempts to accuse us of, than to openly commit to an EBT approach and, thereby, be held to opinions guided by an objective, rulebased analysis of all the best evidence.
In reality, none of us had ever heard of "sound science" as a specific approach to epidemiology analyses before reading the Rudén and Hansson commentary. Nonetheless, we became curious to learn just how the tobacco industry tried to hoodwink the toxicology community into believing cigarettes were safe. The only article Rudén and Hansson cite 59 is a long recounting of people, strategies, meetings, and other events during the 1990s concerning tobacco regulation and litigation (our names do not appear). The only scientific material presented is a list of 15 Good Epidemiology Practices supposedly advanced by the tobacco company as "sound science," but whose origin was the Chemical Manufacturers Association who developed a framework for judging the quality of a study. Having written extensively about the use of epidemiology in EBT, o we scanned the Good Epidemiology Practices principles and found that they set forth the following guidelines:
1) Provide a clear definition of all objectives and hypotheses 2) Pay attention to control group selection 3) Describe all statistical techniques 4) Adhere to the study protocol 5) Train and monitor those administering questionnaires and surveys 6) Analyze results as per study protocol 7) Provide adequate description of the raw data 8) Odds ratios of two or fewer should be treated with caution particularly with wide confidence intervals 9) Be careful in use of meta-analysis 10) Include observations inconsistent with the main body of the data 11) Publish all completed research, regardless of outcome 12) Be aware of interpretation problems if reporting many hypotheses tests not specified by the study protocol 13) Statistically significant association does not in itself provide direct evidence of causal relationship 14) Encourage graphic display of results and figures 15) Use rigorous scientific objectivity when reporting epidemiological results, including defects in study design, conduct and analysis.
What a let down. We have to admit we are hardpressed to find fault with any of these guidelines, most of which are found in prominent textbooks of epidemiology. We find it unfortunate that Rudén and Hansson give the reader no indication as to which of these guidelines they find offensive, or the combination of which leads to the claimed "thorough discrediting of sound science." Dismissing a piece of science or scientific guidelines/principles only because of its source rather than its content, like Rudén and Hansson's entire declamation against EBT, 22 is unprofessional, reveals bias, may be used to produce unsupportable opinions, and indeed, is neither evidence-based nor objective. In summary, the last 2 years have seen a remarkable interest develop in exploring the applications of EBT. With continued discussion and explanation, as went on at International Forum Towards Evidence-Based Toxicology, unwarranted suspicions will diminish. Most encouraging, interest in EBT is not limited just to academic circles but also is appearing in the clinic to improve the care of acutely poisoned patients 60 and, already confounding the naysayers, is appearing in policies of regulatory agencies 56 who, in reality, are well served also by access to the best evidence objectively assessed. The NAS wariness about a cabal of clandestine tobacco industry sympathizers. Further, such an exchange should have eliminated her other false contentions, for example, that EBT was designed to eliminate regulatory risk assessments. o Dr Rudén criticizes our reliance on the Taubes commentary published in Science summarizing the views of the world's top epidemiologists. We did accept the viewpoint from that article that statistically significant relative risks of 3.0 or greater were a "general expectation" for most observational studies given the frequent size, confounding and potential bias limitations of these studies. However, we also noted that smaller relative risks can be justified by high quality or larger studies, and by studies capable of detecting smaller risks. Thus, Dr Rudén's counterfactuals are not only inappropriate, they are misleading. This marks one more instance where reading our entire article would have assisted her comprehension. committee, reviewing the USEPA's dioxin reassessment, put it succinctly 61 : Furthermore, the EPA Reassessment continues to rely on the approach that diverse human data collected across disparate studies of different types and inherent strengths can be interpreted with confidence without applying the more formalized tools of evidence-based medicine. Thus, the EPA Reassessment (as well as Institute of Medicine [IOM] committee report) relies largely on committee-based, consensus evaluation of the available data rather than on specifically commissioned, rigorous analyses constructed according to established criteria that both formally evaluate the strengths of the available evidence and integrate, by quantitative systematic review, the data across available studies.
Encouraged by such developments, we look forward to continued exploration (but not to unfounded personal attacks) in the pages of Human and Experimental Toxicology of the future of EBT. 26 Disclosures and Acknowledgements PS Guzelian, Christine Halmes, and Robert C James have for a fee consulted for or have testified on behalf of (or both) parties in regulatory or litigation matters in which toxicity from a drug or environmental chemical was at issue. We thank Christopher Guzelian for helpful discussions about evidencebased logic.
